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COMMENT 
A FRAUDULENT SCHEME’S PARTICULARITY UNDER 
RULE 9(B) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
Charis Ann Mitchell† 
ABSTRACT 
While the False Claims Act is one of the federal government’s most 
successful tools in recovering money received under a false claim, there 
remains room for improvement. Under the False Claims Act, a citizen, 
known as a relator, may bring a lawsuit, a qui tam action, on behalf of the 
government when the relator knows of a company or individual cheating 
the government. However, this concept has been undermined by the courts’ 
improper application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), where it 
states that fraud must be stated with particularity. Not only does Rule 9(b) 
not properly apply to a qui tam action, but the courts also insist on holding a 
relator to an impossible standard of particularity.  
Although some courts have attempted to give a relator a relaxed pleading 
standard, each attempt has been unsuccessful due to one point: the court 
focuses on particular pleading in the wrong element of an action under the 
False Claims Act. In order to state a cause of action under the Act, the 
relator must plead: (1) there was a claim for a federal fund; (2) the claim 
was false; and (3) the defendant knew of its falsity. The judiciary has been 
demanding a relator plead the first two elements with particularity, meaning 
that the relator must identify a specific claim.  
Such an application undermines the qui tam provisions of the False 
Claims Act and improperly restricts the relator, who has no access to the 
claims themselves, since a relator is not a real party in interest in a qui tam 
action. Therefore, this Comment proposes that Rule 9(b) should apply only 
to a relator’s pleading of a specific fraudulent scheme—that is, applying 
Rule 9(b) to the third element of an action under the Act.  
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The House of Representatives is currently proposing to fix this 
discrepancy between the False Claims Act and the rules of procedure. If the 
legislation is successful, the relator will be granted appropriate leeway in 
the relator’s pleading, providing a balance between pleading with 
particularity under Rule 9(b) and pleading a short and plain statement under 
Rule 8. Such a legislative amendment will functionally override Rule 9(b), 
and solve the problem that has surfaced in the courts.  
Whether the legislature is successful or not, this Comment proposes a 
standard workable under the current state of the law that will cease 
undermining the False Claims Act and the relators’ ability to bring actions 
on behalf of the United States.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act (FCA) is the federal government’s primary anti-
fraud tool.1 Through the assistance of willing citizens throughout the 
country, the United States Department of Justice has been able to recover 
over $21 billion from false claims since the FCA was amended in 1986.2 
Nearly seventy-eight percent of that recovery is associated with suits 
brought by private citizens on behalf of the government. These citizens, 
called “relators,” bring these suits under the qui tam provisions of the 
FCA.3  
While not directly a “fraud” statute, it is nearly unanimous among the 
courts that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure4 9(b)5 applies to these qui tam6 
                                                                                                                           
 1. The False Claims Act (FCA) is located at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006). 
 2. Press Release, Department of Justice, More than $1 Billion Recovered by Justice 
Department in Fraud and False Claims in Fiscal Year 2008 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-civ-992.html.  
 3. Id. 
 4. For space and brevity, this Comment will abbreviate “Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure” as FRCP and refer to individual rules as merely “Rule” with a number following.  
 5. FRCP 9(b) states, “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other 
conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 6. The term “qui tam” is “short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro 
se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s 
behalf as well as his own.’” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000) (emphasis added). A “relator” is the formal term for the 
colloquialism “whistleblower,” the private citizen who reports the fraud. See United States 
ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 225 n.7 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A 
‘relator’ is ‘[a] party in interest who is permitted to institute a proceeding in the name of the 
People or the Attorney General when the right to sue resides solely in that official.’ Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1289 (6th ed. 1990).”)  
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complaints brought under the FCA.7 Rule 9(b) has a significant impact 
upon the relator and the case he filed on behalf of the government.  
When a Rule 9(b) motion is filed against a relator’s complaint, the 
motion is treated as a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).8 A motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and [is] rarely 
granted.”9 Curiously, this is contrary to the incessant application of Rule 
9(b) to qui tam complaints and the frequent dismissals throughout the 
circuits. Under this standard, if a relator fails to satisfy Rule 9(b), his 
complaint may be dismissed with prejudice,10 causing the relator no longer 
to be able to pursue the cause of action on behalf of the government. 
Rule 9(b) requires that any charges of fraud be pled with particularity,11 
and the courts have applied the Rule to every element of an FCA 
complaint.12 In applying Rule 9(b) to each specific element, many courts 
demand that the relator identify a specific false claim for payment or an 
invoice provided to the government. However, such an application 
undermines the purposes of the FCA by holding the relator to an 
unattainable standard of particularity. Therefore, Rule 9(b) should be 
applied only to whether the relator pled a scheme with particularity.  
Even while clinging to this inaccurate application, some circuits have 
attempted to apply a modified standard of pleading for a qui tam 
complaint.13 Some courts evaluate whether a complaint has sufficient 
indicia of reliability,14 and some may relax the standard of particularity 
                                                                                                                           
 7. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370 
(5th Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
 8. See, e.g., United States ex rel. SNAPP, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496 (6th 
Cir. 2008).  
 9. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Consol. Fibers, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 822, 824 
(N.D. Tex. 1998). “A dismissal for failure to state a claim is disfavored in the law and 
justified only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” In re U.S. Abatement Corp., 39 F.3d 556, 559 
(5th Cir. 1994). Further, courts “will only rarely encounter circumstances which justify 
granting such a motion.” Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist. of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921, 926 
(5th Cir. 1988). Both U.S. Abatement Corp. and Mahone are quoted in JAMES B. HELMER, 
JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION 357 (3d ed. 2002). 
 10. Frequently the relator will first be dismissed with leave to amend the complaint, but 
the ultimate result is that the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.  
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 12. As discussed below, every action under the FCA demands that three elements be 
met: (1) there was a claim for a federal fund; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the defendant 
knew of its falsity. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
 14. See infra Part IV.A. 
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when the defendant has exclusive access to the proof of the case.15 
Nevertheless, even these courts continue to miss the mark by continuing to 
focus on and require the pleading of a specific false claim.  
With the purposes of the FCA and the contemporary pleading rules in 
mind, this Comment proposes that the current disarray and misapplication 
of Rule 9(b) in the circuits be solved with a simple standard to evaluate a 
complaint’s particularity. While Rule 9(b) retains an important function in 
the judicial system, in the context of a qui tam claim under the FCA, it is 
essential that the courts apply Rule 9(b) to the defendant’s knowledge of the 
fraudulent scheme, thus rejecting the demand for identification of a specific 
claim for payment in the complaint. Since the relator is not the actual party 
in interest in a qui tam action, most relators do not have access to a cheating 
defendant’s billing documents and invoices, and therefore should be 
allowed to plead the defendant’s fraudulent scheme, that is, the defendant’s 
knowledge of the falsity of a claim for payment. In addition, relators should 
not be forced into the impossible situation of pleading each fraudulent 
invoice.16 This standard fulfills the purposes of imposing particularized 
pleading, while also satisfying the purposes underlying the FCA itself.  
This Comment also addresses the proposed House Revision dubbed the 
“False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007,” which offers an alternative 
solution to the circuit confusion.17 The House of Representatives’ 
proposal18 offers appropriate protections for qui tam defendants while 
balancing the government’s great need for the dedicated relators who assist 
the government in recovering billions of dollars obtained by submitting 
false claims to the government.19 This Comment also discusses the legality 
of such a legislative provision and its ability to functionally override the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the FCA, Rule 9(b), and 
the interrelationship of the two. Part III addresses the disastrous results that 
occur when the courts stringently apply Rule 9(b) to the claim-for-payment 
element of a qui tam action. The various attempts to relax pleading are then 
discussed in Part IV, followed in Part V by a discussion of why Rule 9(b) 
should not be applied to a qui tam complaint. Since courts have incorrectly 
but relentlessly applied Rule 9(b) to an FCA action, Part VI proposes a 
                                                                                                                           
 15. See infra Part IV.A.  
 16. See infra Part VI.   
 17. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 4854, 110th Cong. § 4(e) 
(2007). 
 18. The Senate’s version of the bill does not retain a fix for the Rule 9(b) split, and the 
Senate should be encouraged to adopt the House’s version of the bill. 
 19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
2010] A FRAUDULENT SCHEME’S PARTICULARITY 341 
 
 
standard according to which the courts should apply Rule 9(b) to a qui tam 
complaint. Part VII discusses and evaluates the merits of the House of 
Representatives’ proposal to amend the FCA and remedy the current 
misapplication of the Rule. Part VIII briefly concludes. 
II.  A BACKGROUND OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RULE 9(B) 
A. A Brief History of the False Claims Act 
The False Claims Act was enacted in 1863 during the Civil War in order 
to stop contractors from committing fraud against the military.20 Due to the 
amount of false claims submitted, the FCA was implemented and allowed 
knowledgeable citizens to bring qui tam actions against anyone who 
submitted a false claim to the United States Government.21 “Such persons, 
known as ‘relators,’” became “private attorneys general who were rewarded 
for prosecuting the action by receiving 50 percent of all monies recovered 
in the suit.”22 Although the FCA was not facially a “fraud” statute, the 
intent of passing the FCA was clear: to “prevent and punish frauds upon the 
government of the United States” and include the average citizen in the 
battle.23  
Despite the need for qui tam actions to help the government recover 
falsely obtained money, the FCA was used infrequently.24 In the early part 
of the 1940s, the FCA was amended to prevent people from filing qui tam 
complaints based upon actions that had already been instituted in the 
criminal courts. Once an indictment was brought, the relator would then file 
a qui tam against the same individual for the same claim.25 These 
“parasitic” lawsuits did not satisfy the purpose of the FCA, but rather 
undermined the allowance of the Attorney General to control the litigation 
                                                                                                                           
 20. United States ex rel. Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 
276 F.3d 1032, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 21. HELMER, supra note 9. The Union military was suffering from massive instances of 
fraud and misrepresentations. “Reports of munitions filled with sawdust rather than 
explosives and boots made of cardboard rather than leather abounded. Union soldiers opened 
crates of muskets, only to find them filled with sawdust instead of firearms.” Id. at 35. For a 
comprehensive summary of the history of the FCA, see HELMER, supra note 9, at 34-61. 
 22. HELMER, supra note 9, at 34. 
 23. Id. at 36 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 348 (1863)); see CLAIRE M. 
SYLVIA, FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 38 (2004). The FCA was, in 
essence, “setting a rogue to catch a rogue” by encouraging an individual to turn on the fraud 
doer and report the fraud to the government. United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech. 
Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 293 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 24. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 46. 
 25. HELMER, supra note 9, at 43. 
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against those defrauding the government,26 spurring the FCA amendments 
in 1943.27 The result of these amendments was that the effectiveness of the 
FCA was drastically limited in assisting the government to recover money 
wrongfully obtained.28  
When the government was faced once again with rampant fraud against 
the military, Congress reevaluated the FCA and determined it was essential 
to amend the statute.29 The 1986 Amendments, signed into law by President 
Reagan, enabled the government to intervene in a qui tam action,30 allowed 
the original complaint to be filed under seal for sixty days,31 granted the 
original source exception to the public disclosure bar,32 prohibited 
retaliation against a relator,33 and guaranteed a relator a minimum 
percentage award in a successful qui tam action.34 Congress made further 
                                                                                                                           
 26. See SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 47; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 
537 (1943). Hess is the landmark case that spurred the 1943 amendments to the FCA. In 
Hess, the Supreme Court held that under the original FCA, a relator may bring a civil qui 
tam action against someone even if there was already a criminal indictment on file. In 
response, 
Attorney General Francis Biddle asked Congress to repeal the qui tam 
provisions of the False Claims Act. Congress refused to go so far, but it did 
amend the Act to provide that there would be no jurisdiction over qui tam suits 
whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or 
information in the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or 
employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought. 
United States ex rel. Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 
F.3d 1032, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 46. The key amendment from 1943 was the public 
disclosure bar, preventing these lawsuits. See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States ex 
rel. Stone, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). For a discussion of the public disclosure bar and the original 
source exception issues presented in the Rockwell decision, see Joel D. Hesch, Restating the 
“Original Source Exception” to the False Claims Act’s “Public Disclosure Bar,” 1 LIBERTY 
U. L. REV. 111 (2006). 
 28. HELMER, supra note 9, at 47. The 1943 Amendments undermined the effectiveness 
of the Act in inciting relators to come forward and bring qui tam actions on behalf of the 
government. A percentage award was no longer guaranteed, the percentage was dramatically 
decreased, and the government had to lack knowledge entirely when the action was filed or 
else the action was dismissed. “While the elimination of the guaranteed bounty was 
discouraging, the most devastating effect of the Amendments was the jurisdictional bar that 
prevented any qui tam action unless the government lacked all knowledge of the fraud.” Id. 
 29. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 53. 
 30. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (4) (2006 & Supp. 2009).  
 31. Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
 32. Id. § 3730(e)(4). 
 33. Id. § 3730(h). 
 34. HELMER, supra note 9, at 55-56. See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. 
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minor amendments35 to the FCA in 1988, and this relator-friendly version 
of the statute is the current law.36 
Upon the successful 1986 amendments to the FCA, the FCA became the 
government’s primary tool to recover federal funds wrongfully obtained.37 
Of the approximately $1 billion recovered by the government in 2008, 
relators filing qui tam actions38 were awarded $198 million.39   
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b): The Defendants’ Friend 
In contrast to the movement toward notice pleading in Rule 8, where a 
“short and plain statement” is adequate for pleading,40 Rule 9(b) proclaims 
that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”41 This 
requirement reflects the historical practice of requiring specific pleading in 
English and early American law.42 These two requirements do not 
contradict each other, but flow into a complementary pleading system in 
                                                                                                                           
 35. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 59. These amendments limited the ability to recover as a 
relator when the person was actually perpetrating the fraudulent scheme.  
 36. When the purposes of the FCA are evaluated, the history of the statute itself 
demonstrates the legislative reliance on the relator. It is essential to allow a relator to bring a 
qui tam claim and not impose an impossible standard of pleading, undermining the purpose 
of the FCA and allowing fraudulent contracts to be maintained against the federal 
government. 
 37. Aveco Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
 38. A relator is provided with substantive rights under the FCA. The relator has the right 
to continue with the case if the government chooses to not intervene, a right to remain as a 
joint plaintiff in the action, and a right to a percentage of the amount the government 
recovers as a result of the action. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3730. Without these rights and 
the opportunity for a relator to bring a suit on behalf of the government, the federal 
government would miss many opportunities to collect money paid out under fraudulent or 
false means.  
 39. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, More than $1 Billion Recovered by Justice 
Department in Fraud and False Claims in Fiscal Year 2008 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-civ-992.html.  
 40. FRCP 8(a)(2) provides, “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This rule leads to shorter complaints and a more efficient system of pleading 
in the federal court system.  
 41. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 42. 5A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1296, 30 (3d ed. 2004). 
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which a plaintiff is to plead concisely and clearly the requisite elements of 
fraud to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim.43 
The purposes of Rule 9(b) and its requirement of particularity have been 
delineated by many federal courts.44 These purposes include protecting 
defendants from frivolous claims,45 avoiding cases filed just for settlement 
value,46 discouraging cases merely to reopen a completed transaction,47 
deterring suits filed in an attempt merely to obtain discovery,48 enabling the 
defendant to prepare an appropriate responsive pleading,49 and attempting 
to disfavor cases alleging fraud.50 Courts rarely assign priority among these 
purposes, though allowing the defendant to prepare an appropriate 
responsive pleading is a prevalent concern.  
While some of these purposes behind the requirement of particularity 
under Rule 9(b) may be seen in a relator’s pleading under the FCA, 
requiring a relator to plead a specific claim is shrouded in the language of 
these purposes; however, it is questionable whether these purposes are 
fulfilled by imposing the requirement of strict particularity.51 Nonetheless, 
the requirement of Rule 9(b) remains the court-imposed interpretation for 
all FCA qui tam pleadings. 
                                                                                                                           
 43. Felton v. Walston & Co., 508 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[I]n applying [R]ule 
9(b) we must not lose sight of the fact that it must be reconciled with [R]ule 8 which requires 
a short and concise statement of claims.”).  
 44. See United States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2003); 
United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000); Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 
239 (5th Cir. 2000); Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1998); Banca Cremi, 
S.A. v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997); Campaniello Imports, Ltd. 
v. Saporiti Italia S.P.A., 117 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Stac Electronics Secs. Litig., 89 
F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1996); McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 
1980); In re Credit Acceptance Corp. Secs. Litig., 50 F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
 45. United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Miller Features Syndicate, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 
198, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Since it is a serious matter to charge a person with fraud, a 
plaintiff is not permitted to do so unless he is in a position and is willing to put himself on 
record as to what the alleged fraud consists of specifically.” (citations omitted)). 
 46. See Creative Foods of Ind., Inc. v. My Favorite Muffin, Too, Inc., No. IP 01-0228-
C-T/K, 2002 WL 244584, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 14, 2002) (noting that Rule 9(b) discourages 
inclusion of accusations in complaints “simply to gain leverage for settlement or for other 
ulterior purposes”). 
 47. See Chamberlain Mach. Works v. United States, 270 U.S. 346 (1926).  
 48. See Wafra Leasing Corp. v. Prime Capital Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 987 (N.D. Ill. 
2002). 
 49. See, e.g., Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 164 F.3d 623 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 50. See Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 51. See infra Parts III-VI. 
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C. The Qui Tam Action and Its Relationship to Rule 9(b) 
It has been universally held52 that Rule 9(b) applies to a qui tam 
complaint.53 A prevailing reason for requiring a qui tam complaint to satisfy 
Rule 9(b) is to enable the defendant to mount an appropriate defense;54 in 
order to determine a complaint’s sufficiency under Rule 9(b), “the most 
basic consideration . . . is the determination of how much detail is necessary 
to give adequate notice [to the defendant] . . . and enable him to prepare a 
responsive pleading.”55 Further, as the Sixth Circuit recently determined, a 
relator is to plead with particularity in order to:  
discourage[] fishing expeditions and strike suits which appear 
more likely to consume a defendant’s resources than to reveal 
evidences of wrongdoing. Because the defendant is informed of 
which of its specific actions allegedly constitute fraud, it can 
limit discovery and subsequent litigation to matters relevant to 
these allegations. Additionally, Rule 9(b)’s particularity 
requirement protects a qui tam defendant from unwarranted 
damage to its reputation caused by spurious charges of immoral 
and fraudulent behavior. Because the defendant is notified 
immediately of the focus of a relator’s complaint, it can quickly 
resolve frivolous disputes by attacking the narrow basis of an 
allegation of fraud.56 
Within the determination that the relator is to file a complaint that 
complies with Rule 9(b) particularity, courts have been specific, though not 
                                                                                                                           
 52. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir. 2007). 
While numerous circuits have ruled on the application of Rule 9(b) to the FCA, the United 
States Supreme Court has never evaluated the Rule’s application to qui tam actions under the 
FCA.  
 53. The prevailing, and unreasonable, interpretation requires a relator to plead a specific 
claim for payment in the complaint itself.  
 54. E.g., United States ex rel. SNAPP, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 505 (6th 
Cir. 2008). Providing the defendant with adequate notice is one of the most cited purposes 
by courts deciding motions for dismissal under Rule 9(b). “One possible rationale for this 
treatment is the heightened possibility of spurious allegations in a qui tam suit. These cases 
indicate that courts recognize the need to provide qui tam defendants with the full 
protections provided by Rule 9(b).” JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM 
ACTIONS § 5-04(B), at 5-49 (3d ed. Supp. 2008-2). 
 55. 5A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1298 (3d ed. 2004). 
 56. SNAPP, Inc., 532 F.3d at 504 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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necessarily uniform, in delineating what such compliance looks like.57 
Under the FCA, there are seven possible causes of action against a 
defendant.58 Each of the violations requires three elements: (1) there was a 
claim59 for a federal fund; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the defendant 
                                                                                                                           
 57. This includes the Fifth Circuit, which erroneously applied Rule 9(b) by demanding 
particularity even beyond the actual text of the rule. Rule 9(b) states in relevant part: 
“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 
generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). However, in United States ex rel. Williams v. Bell 
Helicopter Textron Inc., the Fifth Circuit improperly dismissed the relator’s complaint 
despite the relator attaching copies of the false claims submitted to the government and 
names of violating employees along with pleading the relevant time period in 1998. United 
States ex rel. Williams v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 417 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2005). 
The court stated that even though the complaint alleged that “Bell Helicopter discovered 
these false charges and failed to report them to the government,” the complaint did not 
contain the appropriate level of detail as a basis for the defendant’s knowledge. Id. The Fifth 
Circuit ignored the second half of Rule 9(b) that states that knowledge may be pled generally 
and decided to arbitrarily apply the heightened pleading requirement even to the knowledge 
element of the FCA action. Id. Williams stands as another example of courts misapplying the 
Rule, and acting against the proper focus of a qui tam complaint: allowing the federal 
government to benefit from the provision allowing a relator to bring an action on behalf of 
the attorney general. 
 58. The FCA lists seven ways a person may violate the act. If a person 
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim 
for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or 
used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim; (3) 
conspires to commit a violation of [any of the six other methods]; (4) has 
possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the 
Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of 
that money or property; (5) is authorized to make or deliver a document 
certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, 
intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without 
completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true; (6) knowingly 
buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an 
officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, 
who lawfully may not sell or pledge property; or (7) knowingly makes, uses, or 
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation 
to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly 
conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay 
or transmit money or property to the Government, 
that person is liable. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 59. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (defining “claim” in relevant part as, inter alia, “any request or 
demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the 
United States has title to the money or property, that . . . is made to a contractor, grantee, or 
other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to 
advance a Government program or interest, and if the United States Government provides or 
has provided any portion of the money or property requested or demanded”). 
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knew of its falsity.60 Typically, most courts require that the relator plead 
specifics regarding the “time, place, persons, and fraudulent nature of the 
alleged acts.”61 These requirements translate into courts requiring the 
relator to provide detailed and specific claims for payment in the initial 
pleading.62 
III.  THE APPLICATION OF RULE 9(B) TO THE QUI TAM ACTION AND ITS  
DISASTROUS RESULTS 
When the courts require a relator to identify specific invoices or bills,63 
they limit the government’s ability to utilize the False Claims Act.64 By 
dismissing cases that present valid violations of the FCA, the courts thwart 
the purpose of the FCA and devalue the necessity of private citizens 
bringing qui tam actions.  
A definitive illustration of Rule 9(b) undermining the FCA is the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United States ex rel. Karvelas v. 
                                                                                                                           
 60. United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th 
Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Darrig v. Med. Consultants Network, Inc., No. 04-650-HA, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80789, at *5-6 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2006), rev’d and remanded, 303 F. 
App’x 429 (9th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Stewart v. La. Clinic, No. 99-1767, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9401, at *28 (E.D. La. June 4, 2003).  
 61. BOESE, supra note 54, § 5.04, at 5-49. 
 62. Courts vary in what details they require. These details range from contract 
information, patient names, physician names, identification numbers, dates, times, amounts, 
billing cycles, and any other minutiae that results in disallowing a relator from bringing a qui 
tam action under the FCA. However, the Fifth Circuit recently acknowledged the 
impropriety of courts requiring detail that would carry the burden of proof in the relator’s 
complaint: 
Nevertheless, a plaintiff does not necessarily need the exact dollar amounts, 
billing numbers, or dates to prove to a preponderance that fraudulent bills were 
actually submitted. To require these details at pleading is one small step shy of 
requiring production of actual documentation with the complaint, a level of 
proof not demanded to win at trial and significantly more than any federal 
pleading rule contemplates. 
United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 63. In other words, a specific claim. 
 64. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 537. By disallowing valid qui tam complaints because of a 
procedural dissection, the government will lose the valuable assistance of relators 
contemplated and intended under the FCA. “The Act is designed to encourage private 
individuals to report and pursue allegations of fraud against the Government. Because these 
private individuals are ordinarily not parties to the relevant transaction with the Government, 
they may be unaware of some of the details of the alleged false or fraudulent conduct.” Id. 
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Melrose-Wakefield Hospital.65 In 2004, the First Circuit improperly applied 
Rule 9(b), affirming the district court’s dismissal66 of a qui tam action that 
outlined numerous fraudulent schemes.67 In Karvelas, the relator was 
employed at the defendant hospital for fifteen years. He claimed that the 
hospital “falsely certified” that it was in compliance with Medicare 
standards for three years.68 By making these false certifications, the relator 
alleged that the hospital “wrongfully billed Medicare and/or Medicaid, 
presumably on the basis of services that were being provided improperly or 
not at all.”69 
In his complaint, the relator made detailed allegations about thirteen 
fraudulent schemes the defendants were committing against the 
government. Not only did he have direct knowledge of the false claims 
submitted,70 but he also clearly described the billing of twelve respiratory 
therapists when the hospital only employed seven;71 that the hospital did not 
use appropriate testing machinery, which was required for federal 
reimbursement;72 and that the defendants had filed improper claims because 
they knew the bills were for unnecessary medical treatment.73 The District 
                                                                                                                           
 65. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 
2004). 
 66. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., No. 01-10583-DPW, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 67. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 221. 
 68. Id. at 223.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Karvelas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *15 (“He states that he witnessed the 
fraudulent conduct alleged herein, but does not provide specifics regarding the documents 
submitted to HCFA to make the false claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 71. Id. 
In the complaint, Karvelas states that the documents signed under the penalty 
of perjury and false statement submitted to the United States Government 
certified that there were 11.8 Respiratory Therapists, but does not provide any 
further detail regarding what type of document it was, when it was submitted, 
or by whom it was submitted. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72. Id. at *18. 
The hospital performed blood tests with machinery and equipment that was not 
tested, or up to code, or certified, and did not meet the standards accepted by 
the medical community, which were not in compliance with the Clinical 
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 nor had certification from the 
College of American Pathologists, which Karvelas alleges are required to 
receive payment under Medicaid and Medicare. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at *19-20 (“In contravention of Medicare and Medicaid provisions, which 
require that services be certified as being medically necessary, the defendants knowingly 
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Court dismissed the complaint despite the relator’s firsthand knowledge and 
his dialogue with the defendants about the fraudulent schemes, because he 
failed to identify a specific invoice, bill, or claim for payment in his 
complaint.74  
The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. 
The appellate court declared that the complaint was merely attempting to 
mine discovery, and that the ninety-three-page complaint, even read in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, could not present a viable claim.75 
Despite the relator alleging that he had incriminating documents76 and 
identifying some physicians by name,77 the court stated that:  
details concerning the dates of the claims, the content of the 
forms or bills submitted, their identification numbers, the amount 
of money charged to the government, the particular goods or 
services for which the government was billed, the individuals 
involved in the billing, and the length of time between the 
alleged fraudulent practices and the submission of claims based 
on those practices are the types of information that may help a 
relator to state his or her claims with particularity.78 
The court determined that the complaint failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)79 
because the relator did not plead a specific date, exact claim for payment, 
specific identification numbers, individuals involved in improper billing,80 
                                                                                                                           
filed improper claims in that they presented claims for medical items or service that they 
knew were not medically necessary.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 74. The court also determined that the documents were not solely in the defendant’s 
possession, and therefore Karvelas could not attempt to rely on a theory that he did not have 
access to the actual claims. Id. at *29. 
 75. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 231 (1st 
Cir. 2004). 
 76. Karvelas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *18 (“Karvelas also states that he is in 
possession of time sheets that reflect the staffing issues dating from 1996-97 but has not 
provided this documentation.”). 
 77. Id. at *24 (“He alleges that the defendant hospital steered and channeled patients to 
a home health company in which it had an interest. He also alleges that Dr. Sen, Dr. 
Mohammed Akabarian, Dr. Michael Zak, and other hospital staff engaged in ‘self-referrals’ 
and ‘conflicts of interest’ . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 78. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 233. 
 79. Id. at 235. “As the district court correctly concluded, Karvelas’s failure to identify 
with particularity any actual false claims that the defendants submitted to the government is, 
ultimately, fatal to his complaint.” Id. 
 80. The court failed to recognize that Karvelas did name physicians. Karvelas, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *24.  
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or the source of information for his allegations.81 The complaint was 
dismissed despite the relator’s clear and detailed identification of ongoing 
fraudulent schemes.  
This First Circuit case does not stand alone in its improper application of 
Rule 9(b). The Fifth Circuit also relied on fundamentally flawed analysis in 
dismissing the relator’s complaint in United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic 
Healthcare Management Group.82 In Russell, the relator brought an action 
alleging that her employer was charging Medicare for services that were 
never rendered.83 The relator’s complaint described the time period during 
which the scheme occurred, the names of patients who were ineligible to be 
charging Medicare, and the fact that the defendant had instructed the 
workers to “generate regular records for [the defendant’s] ineligible 
Medicare-patients even thought [sic] they did not qualify for medicare [sic] 
services.”84 In her complaint, Russell alleged personally witnessing 
inaccurate billing.85 
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit determined that the complaint did not 
satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement and dismissed the claim. In a 
cursory discussion, the court held that in order to satisfy Rule 9, a relator 
must plead a specific “claim” presented to the government: “Because such 
statements or claims are among the circumstances constituting fraud in a 
False Claims Act suit, these must be pled with particularity under Rule 
9(b).”86 Ignoring the specificity of the allegations that would direct the 
                                                                                                                           
 81. Id. at *2-3.  Sadly, the relator made it clear that he knew of the schemes first hand, 
and the district court even laid out the circumstances in its opinion: 
Karvelas alleges that, on September 9, 1996, he notified the Vice President of 
Human Resources, Richard Kenny, that the hospital should take corrective 
action regarding defective arterial blood gas (ABG) testing machinery, about 
understaffing and patient neglect. Karvelas also claims he informed Kenny his 
supervisors had destroyed incident reports regarding medical errors. He 
complained to Kenny that he had been directed by his supervisor to complete 
patient evaluations, which were improperly billed to Medicare and Medicaid, 
and had been threatened with retaliation if they failed to participate in this 
illegal activity. 
Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnotes omitted). 
 82. United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Group, 193 F.3d 304 (5th 
Cir. 1999). Due to the Fifth Circuit’s cursory disposal of the relator’s claim, the facts must 
be derived from the briefs provided in the case.  
 83. Brief of Appellants at 5, 6, United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. 
Group, 193 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-20743), 1998 WL 34085825. 
 84. Id. at 11. 
 85. Brief of Appellees at 4, United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. 
Group, 193 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-20743), 1999 WL 33613046. 
 86. Russell, 193 F.3d at 308. 
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defendant to the fraudulent scheme and the eyewitness account of the 
relator, the court refused to “relax” the pleading standard.87 
These two cases are merely representative samples of many such 
decisions where the relator provides more than sufficient notice and detail 
concerning the nature of the allegations, sufficient reliability, and a 
firsthand view of the fraudulent scheme that exploited the federal 
government. Yet the courts continue to insist on a rigid application of Rule 
9(b) to the claim for payment itself. The complaints being dismissed are not 
situations of mere speculation or information and belief. Some of the 
relators that are dismissed are employed in the very department carrying out 
the fraudulent scheme, with firsthand knowledge of exactly how the scheme 
works, describing the particular actors and the actual instructions that create 
the scheme to cheat the government—in other words, the ideal relator under 
the FCA. The only missing piece is what particular invoices contained the 
payments of a false claim, so the courts determine that Rule 9(b) need only 
be applied to the claim-for-payment aspect of the FCA action.  
Such cases provide a perfect snapshot of the dangers of improperly 
applying Rule 9(b), and the government and taxpayers are suffering through 
this misapplication. For instance, if the First Circuit had appropriately 
allowed the relator to plead the fraudulent schemes with particularity,88 then 
Karvelas would have been allowed to continue in his case and assist the 
government in recovering millions of dollars obtained through fraudulent 
devices. The defendant would not be compromised, because when provided 
with such particular detail of the scheme, the defendant is put on sufficient 
notice to prepare a response and will be able to cite to the invoices from its 
own files.  
IV.  JUDICIAL RELAXATION OF RULE 9(B): AN ATTEMPT TO  
QUALIFY THE MISAPPLICATION 
Although courts have labored under the rigid belief that the “claim” 
element(s) of a qui tam complaint must be pled with particularity, many 
courts have carved exceptions for some relators’ complaints. These 
exceptions normally fall into one of two categories: (1) where the complaint 
                                                                                                                           
 87. Id. at 308-09.  
 88. That is, describing the procedures that were in violation of the federal requirements, 
the years in which the scheme occurred, the general overarching plan, and, if applicable, the 
people with whom the relator spoke about the scheme yet was denied any remedy. In 
essence, pleading the third prong of an FCA qui tam action: knowing of the falsity. See supra 
notes 65-74 and accompanying text. 
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possesses appropriate indicia of reliability,89 or (2) when the evidence is 
exclusively within the defendant’s control.90 
A. A Complaint’s Indicia of Reliability  
If a complaint carries sufficient “indicia of reliability” on its face, some 
courts91 will not dismiss the complaint despite the fact that it lacks a 
specific claim for payment being pled.92 The indicia of reliability 
determination usually relies on the relator being an insider and working in 
the billing or accounting department of the defendant.93 This concept of a 
minor relaxation from demanding a specific invoice finds its roots in the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals with its decision in United States ex rel. 
Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc.94 Just as Karvelas is a lasting 
testament to the misapplication of Rule 9(b), Clausen is a decision 
demonstrating the disaster of strict application of Rule 9(b) to the claim 
element, dismissing a strong complaint on the erroneous analysis that it did 
not satisfy the strictures of Rule 9(b). Nevertheless, the Clausen decision is 
the source of “indicia of reliability.” 
 1. Indicia of Reliability: Roots in Misapplication 
In United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc., 
Clausen filed a qui tam action naming one of his employer’s competitors as 
defendant; the complaint alleged over a decade of fraudulent billing 
practices in the defendant’s testing services.95 After the relator amended his 
                                                                                                                           
 89. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 
1158 (N.D. Ill. 2007); cf. Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(affirming dismissal of complaint). 
 90. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336 
F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Gwinn, No. 5:06-cv-00267, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26361 
(S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2008) (determining that even though the action was not a qui tam filed 
by a relator, the indicia of reliability standard could still be applied); cf. United States ex rel. 
Nichols v. Omni H.C., Inc., No. 4:02-cv-66(HL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25441 (M.D. Ga. 
Mar. 31, 2008) (dismissing complaint); United States ex rel. Digiovanni v. St. 
Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., No. CV404-190, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9935 (S.D. Ga. 
Feb. 8, 2008) (same). 
 92. See United States ex rel. Walker v. R&F Properties of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d 
1349 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 93. See United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 94. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
 95. Id. at 1303. 
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complaint twice, the complaint was dismissed, with the dismissal affirmed 
by the appellate court.96 Clausen provided detailed information about 
conversations with employees, descriptions and codes for medical tests that 
represented the false claims, and three patient histories.97 In his second 
amended complaint, Clausen even provided “a table of medical test codes,” 
model forms that would have been presented to the government as a bill, 
descriptions of how the testing would be identified, and the identification of 
patient lists and code charts that would reveal the false claims filed with the 
government.98 Clausen even identified the day the service was rendered. 
However, the defendant persisted in moving for dismissal because Clausen 
did not identify a specific false claim that was submitted to the 
government.99   
                                                                                                                           
The essence of his allegations is that between the late 1980s and 1998 LabCorp 
performed unauthorized, unnecessary or excessive medical tests on LTCF 
residents who participated in Government-funded health insurance programs 
and then knowingly submitted bills for this work to agents of the Government, 
requesting taxpayer funds to which it was not entitled. Clausen also alleges that 
although LabCorp was entitled to receive payments for some work related to its 
testing services, such as blood draws and transportation costs, it overbilled for 
those services during this time period as a result of the improper tests it 
performed. 
Id. 
 96. Id. at 1315. 
 97. Id. at 1304. 
 98. Id. at 1306. 
The Second Amended Complaint suggested one can understand many details 
about the alleged false claims by (1) looking at one of the three LTCF patient 
lists identifying what tests each patient was receiving, (2) obtaining the 
appropriate codes for those tests from the medical test code chart, and (3) 
turning to the blank Form 1500 to see how LabCorp would have filled out a 
claim for each individual with this information. 
Id. 
 99. Id. at 1307. 
[T]he district court concluded that Clausen’s revised pleading suffers from the 
same defect as the [First] Amended Complaint in that it did not identif[y] a 
single fraudulent claim by date filed, amount or claim number that was actually 
submitted to the government. The district court pointed out that [i]dentifying 
the type of claim form used and stating that a claim was filed on the day of 
service or a few days thereafter is not sufficient to identify the fraud claims 
with sufficient particularity to comply with Rule 9(b) in the context of this 
case. Continuing to enforce the dictates of Rule 9(b), the district court added 
that [t]he particularity requirement of Rule 9 is a nullity if Plaintiff gets a ticket 
to the discovery process without identifying a single false claim by amount. 
Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The appellate court agreed, again stating that the complaint’s “fatal flaw” 
was having no specific false claim identified. In making this decision, the 
court stated:  
Rule 9(b)’s directive that “the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake shall be stated with particularity” does not permit a 
False Claims Act plaintiff merely to describe a private scheme in 
detail but then to allege simply and without any stated reason for 
his belief that claims requesting illegal payments must have been 
submitted, were likely submitted or should have been submitted 
to the Government. . . . [I]f Rule 9(b) is to be adhered to, some 
indicia of reliability must be given in the complaint to support 
the allegation of an actual false claim for payment being made to 
the Government.100 
The court proceeded to find that since Clausen was a corporate 
“outsider,”101 his complaint demonstrated no indicia of reliability and 
therefore must fail since he did not plead any individual false claims.102 The 
                                                                                                                           
 100. Id. at 1311 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 101. Clausen filed a suit against a competitor; the court did not elaborate on whether 
Clausen’s complaint would have passed muster if he was an “insider.” See id. at 1314. 
 102. Id. at 1315. While “indicia of reliability” was merely mentioned in passing in 
Clausen, it has developed into a test on its own to determine whether the complaint satisfies 
Rule 9(b) or not. This is a good development for qui tam complaints and the private citizens 
who bring these actions, but defendants see it from another side: 
The “indicia of reliability” test has, unfortunately, developed from a minor 
factor in Clausen to a deciding factor . . . . This development is contrary to the 
language and intent of Rule 9(b), as well as established authority in other 
circuits. Rule 9(b) is an unequivocal pleading requirement: it sets forth what 
“particulars” must be included on the fact of the complaint. Indeed, Rule 9(a) 
specifically states that it “is not necessary to aver the capacity of the party to 
sue” unless “necessary to show the jurisdiction of the court.” By relying so 
heavily on the capacity of the party, the prior job descriptions, roles or 
knowledge of the party, the Eleventh Circuit is effectively relaxing the Rule 
9(b) pleading requirements whenever relators aver that their insider status 
provides an “indicia of reliability” to unacceptably vague pleadings. 
BOESE, supra note 54, § 5.04(b), at 5-62.5. Boese fails to recognize the purposes behind the 
FCA and the purposes of the Rule 9 requirements in the first place: providing the defendant 
with notice in order to prepare a defense. When a relator has laid out a specific allegation of 
a long-term fraudulent scheme, the defendant will be more than able to mount a defense. The 
defendant, or anyone in the qui tam action, will know exactly what is being alleged against 
it.  
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Eleventh Circuit would soon take the indicia of reliability evaluation and 
make it a deciding factor in ruling on a Rule 9(b) motion.103  
 2. The Eleventh Circuit: Closer to the Goal, yet Still Falling Short 
The Eleventh Circuit proceeded to apply the indicia of reliability 
evaluation in United States ex rel. Walker104 and the unpublished Hill v. 
Morehouse Medical Associates decision.105  
In Walker, the appellate court evaluated a nurse practitioner’s allegation 
that the hospital submitted false claims to Medicare, billing for services 
rendered by a physician when the services were actually performed by a 
nurse or a physician assistant.106 The District Court denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.107 
Distinguishing the Clausen case from the case then at hand, the appellate 
court determined that since the relator was a nurse practitioner, had billed 
as a physician, and had entered into personal discussions regarding the 
billing procedure, the relator had alleged sufficient facts to put the 
defendant on notice of the allegations against it.108 Even though the court 
was hesitant because the relator never pointed to a specific claim for 
payment in her complaint, it allowed the case to move forward. 
Though a step in the right direction, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision still 
does not satisfy the purposes of the FCA. While the court’s ultimate 
decision to allow the relator’s case to go forward was correct, the decision 
failed to reach the heart of the issue; the Eleventh Circuit still demands that 
a specific claim for payment be pled. In Walker,109 the relator actually 
participated in the false billing. The so-called relaxation that took place 
does not protect a relator employee who was not directly involved in the 
                                                                                                                           
 103. Not only did Clausen appropriately plead a fraudulent scheme, but he also offered 
specific details on the who, what, where, when, and how that should have satisfied Rule 9(b) 
analysis. In other words, he sufficiently pled that the defendant had knowledge of the claim’s 
falsity. See Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1304-06. 
 104. United States ex rel. Walker v. R&F Properties of Lake County, Inc., 433 F.3d 1349 
(11th Cir. 2005). 
 105. Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936 (11th Cir. 
Aug. 15, 2003). Under the Eleventh Circuit rules of procedure, unpublished opinions “are 
not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. 
R. 36-2. Though unpublished, the Hill decision carries persuasive weight and was followed 
in the Northern District of Alabama. United States ex rel. Brunson v. Narrows Health & 
Wellness L.L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Ala. 2006). 
 106. Walker, 433 F.3d at 1353. 
 107. Id. at 1360.  
 108. Id. 
 109. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
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false billing. The Eleventh Circuit properly allowed the relator to move 
forward because her complaint had sufficient indicia of reliability.110 
However, due to the focus on the claim element of the action, if she had not 
been the nurse who actually made incorrect bills, she would have been 
dismissed for not identifying a specific bill or invoice.111 
The Eleventh Circuit continued to apply the idea of indicia of reliability 
in the unpublished Hill opinion, where it held that the relator’s complaint 
met the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).112 Hill worked as a coder 
and biller for the defendant, and she alleged that the defendant instituted a 
scheme of submitting claims for work that was never performed. Hill 
amended her complaint to include the coding process, the forms, and details 
about “five fraudulent billing schemes, who engaged in them, and the 
frequency of the schemes.”113 Hill saw dozens of claims filed but did not 
identify any specific patients, dates, or any actual claims submitted to the 
government.114 
Due to the lack of claim for payment in the pleading, the district court 
dismissed her complaint, but the Eleventh Circuit stated that proper indicia 
of reliability would save a relator’s complaint.115 In this case, Hill was 
employed “in the very department where she alleged the fraudulent billing 
schemes occurred,” “had firsthand information” about the billing, pointed 
                                                                                                                           
 110. For a critique against the use of the indicia of reliability test, see BOESE, supra note 
54, § 5.04(b), at 5-57–5-58. 
 111. Walker, 433 F.3d at 1360. 
Walker’s complaint identifies her as a nurse practitioner who was employed at 
LFM. Walker alleges that, during her employment at LFM, she never had her 
own UPIN and that she was instructed each day which doctor she would be 
billing under. The Amended Complaint also alleges that Walker had at least 
one personal discussion with LFM’s office administrator (identified in the 
complaint by name) during which the two women discussed that Walker did 
not have her own UPIN, whether Walker and the other nurse practitioners and 
physician assistants should have their own UPINs, that (according to the office 
administrator) LFM billed all nurse practitioner and physician assistant services 
as rendered incident to the service of a physician, that . . . LFM had never billed 
nurse practitioner or physician assistant services in another manner, and the 
propriety of the billing method. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 112. Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936, at *5 (11th 
Cir. Aug. 15, 2003). 
 113. Id. at *1. 
 114. Id. at *2.  
 115. Even though unpublished, Hill was followed in United States ex rel. Brunson v. 
Narrows Health & Wellness LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (holding the 
relator’s complaint satisfied Rule 9(b)). 
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to documents in the defendant’s possession, and knew the specific codes 
that were upcoded.116  
Although positive at first blush, Hill and its application of Rule 9(b) 
contain the same deficiencies as Walker. Though taking a step forward and 
not forcing a relator to plead a specific bill, invoice, or claim, both 
decisions still force the relator to actually participate in the billing and 
submission of claims. Thus, the indicia of reliability “relaxation,” while 
moving in the right direction, refuses to address the problem: the court is 
perpetuating a rigid application of Rule 9(b) to the claim-for-payment 
element of the FCA action.  
 3. The Eighth Circuit: Dismissing Relators’ Claims Despite Their 
Indicia of Reliability 
The Eighth Circuit profoundly demonstrates the deficiency in seeking 
specific indicia of reliability in lieu of a distinct claim.117 In United States 
ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital, Inc.,118 the relator was an 
anesthesiologist who administered anesthesia at the defendant hospital for 
seven years.119 In his complaint, Dr. Joshi alleged that the defendants 
received Medicare reimbursement for services being performed by a doctor 
when a doctor actually had not directed or supervised the work,120 that the 
defendants would bill Medicare for entire boxes of supplies or prescriptions 
rather than the amount actually used,121 and that the defendant participated 
in a conspiracy in violation of the FCA.122 
In his first complaint, the relator merely alleged, “St. Luke’s had all the 
work done by the CRNAs and Dr. Bashiti assigned to itself, and the 
medical bills to the government sufficiently identify the time, place, and 
content of the fraudulent representations.”123 After he received leave to 
amend, the relator added a table that identified the anesthesia services 
provided, the time, the surgeon, the patient initials, the CRNA who 
performed the services, and a table that summarized, based on information 
                                                                                                                           
 116. Hill, 2003 WL 22019936, at *4.  
 117. Ironically, a leading author believes the indicia of reliability test is harming the 
defendants in an FCA action brought by a relator. See generally BOESE, supra note 54.  
 118. United States ex rel. Joshi v. Saint Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 119. Id. at 553.  
 120. Id. “Dr. Joshi alleges that Dr. Bashiti failed both to perform pre-anesthetic 
evaluations and prescribe anesthesia plans, and Dr. Bashiti falsely certified he supervised or 
directed the work of several certified registered nurse anesthetists.” Id. 
 121. Id. at 554.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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and belief, the medications that were issued to patients and improperly 
billed in 1995.124 
The Eighth Circuit, even though touting that it would evaluate indicia of 
reliability, still dismissed the complaint. Despite the relator clearly 
describing specific instances of false billing,125 the Eighth Circuit found it 
appropriate to dismiss Dr. Joshi’s complaint because he did not sufficiently 
plead the “‘who, what, where, when, and how’ of the alleged fraud.”126 In 
other words, he did not identify a specific claim for payment.127  
The only difference between Dr. Joshi and his relator counterparts in the 
Eleventh Circuit cases of Walker and Hill is that he was not actually 
participating in the false billing. He was merely an anesthesiologist who 
worked with the individuals committing the false billing for seven years.128 
Such a dismissal undermines the FCA. Despite the relator providing a 
chart with intricate details,129 the court still determined that, under the 
misapplied particularity standard of Rule 9(b), the relator could not satisfy 
the heavy pleading burden because he provided no claim numbers.130 
Joshi is a capstone demonstrating that even though a court may speak in 
terms of indicia of reliability, the continual focus on pleading a specific bill 
or invoice is an improper application of the Rule. Rule 9 is satisfied when a 
complaint, such as the relator’s in Joshi, sufficiently and with particularity 
lays out the who, what, where, when, and how of a fraudulent scheme. Still, 
the complaint fails under the courts’ current misapplications in the qui tam 
context.  
                                                                                                                           
 124. Id. at 555.  
 125. Dr. Joshi was an anesthetist, the origination of the false claims alleged against the 
hospital and Dr. Bashiti. After spending seven years working with the doctor and the system 
of the hospital, it is difficult to conceive of someone who could provide more sufficient 
indicia of reliability. See generally id. 
 126. Joshi, 441 F.3d at 556 (quoting United States ex rel. Costner v. URS Consultants, 
Inc., 317 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
 127. Any individual reading the opinion can see that he actually did answer all five of the 
journalistic questions—but not in the form of a specific claim.  
 128. Joshi, 441 F.3d at 557. 
 129. Including the initials of the patients that were served on the bill sent to Medicare. Id. 
at 555. 
 130. Again, when a Rule 9(b) motion is brought forward, the court is to assume all facts 
alleged in the complaint are true. A motion to dismissed is disfavored. See supra note 9. 
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B. Another Attempt at Misapplication: When the Information Is 
Exclusively in the Defendant’s Control  
While some courts attempted to implement the indicia of reliability as 
some relaxation in applying Rule 9(b) in the qui tam context, a few courts 
have attempted to relax current Rule 9(b) strictures when the information 
about specific claims made to the government is exclusively in the 
defendant’s control.131  
Because a relator is not the harmed party in a qui tam action, the relator 
does not have access to the actual documentation of the false claims.132 In a 
typical court case, the person filing the action is the injured party and has 
possession of the incriminating documents. However, a qui tam plaintiff 
stands in the place of the federal government, the real party in interest. 
Therefore, the main obstacles to pleading fraud with particularity manifest 
themselves when the government chooses not to intervene133 in the relator’s 
action.134 Thus, a relator does not have access to the needed documents and 
has no access to the necessary detail to identify specific claims being 
submitted to the government. A relator may not have been employed in the 
defendant’s billing department or copied documents before leaving his job. 
                                                                                                                           
 131. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336 
F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir. 2003) (“It is true that the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) may be 
to some extent relaxed where . . . the facts relating to the alleged fraud are peculiarly within 
the perpetrator’s knowledge.”). This rule has also been applied in other fraud or fraud-based 
claims: “We have noted on a number of occasions that the particularity requirement of Rule 
9(b) must be relaxed where the plaintiff lacks access to all facts necessary to detail his claim, 
and that is most likely to be the case where, as here, the plaintiff alleges a fraud against one 
or more third parties.” Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
 132. In 2009, the Seventh Circuit put a spin on this exception in United States ex rel. 
Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2009). The relator did not have 
access to the actual invoices or contracts, but alleged specific parts that violated the 
government contracts. Rather than adopting the defendant’s theory regarding Rule 9(b), the 
court stated that the relator did not have access to the paperwork to make the specified 
allegations, so as long as there was enough information in the complaint for the court to 
make an inference of fraud, the complaint passed muster. Id. Assumedly, the relaxation was 
due to the fact that he did not have access to the incriminating documents.   
 133. When the government chooses not to intervene in the case pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(b)(4)(B), the relator may choose to continue in prosecuting the action on the 
government’s behalf under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). Even if the government initially chooses 
not to intervene in the action, it may still do so later on in the proceeding, at the 
government’s sole discretion. When the government exercises this choice to not intervene 
the relator has the most problems with satisfying Rule 9(b). 
 134. Anna Mae Walsh Burke, Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for Uncle Sam, 21 NOVA L. 
REV. 869, 899 (1997) (stating that a relator could plead actual invoices, amounts, and 
purchase agreements only when the government intervenes in the case). 
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The defendant then is in exclusive control of the necessary documentation 
displaying a specific invoice or bill.135  
Therefore, since the relator may not have access to the exact claim 
numbers or documents, when the evidence is in the defendant’s control, a 
relator may not have to identify a specific claim.136 While a relator is still 
held to Rule 9(b) particularity and obligated to plead the “time, place, and 
contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person 
making the misrepresentation and what that person obtained thereby,”137 
there is a chance that the relator may not have to identify a specific claim. 
 1. Application of “Defendant’s Control”: Still Focused on a Specific 
Claim  
The Northern District of Illinois aptly evaluated a complaint when the 
information was exclusively in the defendant’s control in United States ex 
rel. Yannacopolous v. Lockheed Martin Corp.138 In Yannacopolous, the 
relator was a consultant who worked on a contract selling American 
military equipment to the Greek government.139 Lockheed Martin140 was 
awarded the lucrative contract to sell F-16s to the Greeks.141 The relator 
brought a seven-count complaint, alleging the defendants engaged in 
numerous schemes: (1) submitting false statements for the F-16 airframe, 
(2) submitting false records in relation to maintenance, (3) submitting false 
statements about the production of the goods, (4) submitting false claims 
for work never actually performed, (5) submitting claims to collect in 
excess of what they were entitled to, (6) failing to disclose a price 
                                                                                                                           
 135. Some courts have determined in similar situations that it is appropriate not to 
dismiss a relator’s complaint. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Downy v. Corning, Inc., 118 F. 
Supp. 2d 1160 (D.N.M. 2000). 
 136. Unlike an average fraud case, a relator is not in possession of the necessary 
information to sufficiently fulfill all of the requisite elements of the violation—e.g., identity 
of a specific claim, names and dates of the people who are participating in the fraud, etc. 
Typically, the defendant is the only party who knows this information, and the defendant is 
the party who knows it the best, so the courts should not waste precious time worrying that 
the defendant will not be aware of the conduct for which it is accused. HELMER, supra note 
9, at 357. 
 137. Williams v. WMX Tech., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tuchman 
v. DSC Commc’n Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 138. United States ex rel. Yannacopolous v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 939 
(N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 139. Id. at 941. 
 140. Lockheed was the successor company that took over the contract negotiations and 
sales.  
 141. Yannacopolous, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 943. 
2010] A FRAUDULENT SCHEME’S PARTICULARITY 361 
 
 
adjustment, and (7) modifying a contract to overcharge the government by 
over $29 million.142 
The relator did not identify any specific invoices in his complaint, 
garnering a motion for dismissal for failing to plead fraud with particularity. 
The defendant claimed that the relator failed to allege the who, what, when, 
and where of the fraudulent scheme.143 The court disagreed. “Those details . 
. . are in the exclusive possession of defendants, and relator need not allege 
them under Rule 9(b).”144 The relator was thus allowed to continue in his 
quest to recover money paid out by the government due to false claims. The 
relator appropriately cited “what the defendants did to defraud the United 
States,” and pled “specific timeframes”; demanding greater specificity of 
“where” would undermine the purpose of notice pleading under Rule 8.145 
Further, the relator had no access to this information, and since that was the 
case, demanding more specificity would not be feasible.146 
Since the relator was able to sufficiently apprise the defendant of the 
situation for which it was being sued, it was appropriate to allow the 
complaint to move forward. Yannacopolous did not have access to the 
defendant’s records and thus was incapable of identifying a specific claim 
for payment. If he had been required to plead a specific claim, his 
complaint would have been dismissed with no opportunity to exercise the 
qui tam right granted to him under the FCA. Nevertheless, the court still 
erroneously focused on the claim element of the action, rather than 
acknowledging that the fraudulent scheme was pled with particularity. 
Another District Court applied the relaxed standard of “in the 
defendant’s control” to the pleading in United States ex rel. Downy v. 
Corning, Inc.147 The relator in Downy offered a complaint that sufficiently 
alleged an overall fraudulent scheme of over-reporting to Medicare in order 
to receive more money, but did not specify any specific false claim for 
payment.148 However, she did identify the time period, the defendants, and 
the alleged wrongdoing. In response to a motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b) 
because the relator did not specify any false claims, the court stated, “The 
Court notes some form of limited discovery would probably be necessary to 
allow Relator to provide such specific examples, if they exist, since 
information concerning the physicians who requested PSA/PAP tests from 
                                                                                                                           
 142. Id. at 944. 
 143. Id. at 945-46. 
 144. Id. at 945. 
 145. Id. at 945-46 (citations omitted). 
 146. Id. 
 147. United States ex rel. Downy v. Corning, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D.N.M. 2000). 
 148. Id. at 1172. 
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Defendants’ laboratories is undoubtedly in Defendants’ possession rather 
than the public domain.”149 Therefore, the motion for dismissal was denied 
because the relator had no access to the documentation that was exclusively 
in the defendant’s control.  
Yannacopolous and Downy, while allowing the relators to move forward 
with their complaints, still erroneously focused on the pleading of a claim 
itself, rather than the defendant’s comprehension of falsity and the 
fraudulent scheme. In any event, some courts do not acknowledge any 
relaxation if the relator has no access to the documents,150 and even courts 
that do proclaim a relaxed standard still dismiss otherwise adequate qui tam 
complaints. 
 2. Relators Still Slip Through the Cracks of Dismissal Under the “In 
the Defendant’s Control” Theory 
Even those circuits that acknowledge the inadequacy of forcing a relator 
to identify specific claims fail to properly apply Rule 9(b). For example, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has applied an exception when “the 
facts relating to the alleged fraud are peculiarly within the defendant’s 
knowledge.”151 Nevertheless, the court determined that the exception “must 
not be mistaken for a license to base claims of fraud on speculation and 
conclusory allegations.”152 This translates into dismissing complaints when 
they do not identify a specific invoice or bill, whether or not the relator has 
access to the information.  
The Fifth Circuit fell into this trap in an unpublished opinion in 2005.153 
In Sealed Appellant I, the relator laid out a fraudulent scheme in which the 
defendant allegedly failed to satisfy requirements for ambulance runs to be 
reimbursed by Medicare.154 The appellant was a former Director of 
Compliance for the appellee and had been fired before he could collect his 
personal effects and documents that would have supported his qui tam 
claim.155 
                                                                                                                           
 149. Id. at 1173. 
 150. See, e.g., Corsello v. Lincare, Inc. 428 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 151. United States ex rel. Sandra Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Group, 193 F.3d 304, 
308 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 152. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 
(5th Cir. 1997). 
 153. Sealed Appellant I v. Sealed Appellee I, 156 F. App’x 630 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 154. Id. at 631.  
 155. Id. at 632. The Appellant also brought a claim for wrongful discharge under 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(h), which provides in relevant part: 
Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief necessary to 
make that employee, contractor, or agent whole, if that employee, contractor, or 
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The appellant’s complaint was dismissed even though he discussed the 
training sessions for the billing clerks, his experience as a Director of 
Compliance, and a supervisor’s specific instructions.156 The appellant 
attempted to convince the court that he was entitled to a relaxed pleading 
standard because the information necessary to plead a specific false claim 
was in the appellee’s possession. However, the court curtly dismissed this 
plea, stating that the appellant had not shown any effort to obtain the 
information from any other source and therefore, was not entitled to a 
relaxed pleading standard.157 “[N]othing prevented Appellant from 
contacting Appellee’s employees on his own, whether before commencing 
the litigation or after. Accordingly, the district court properly granted 
Appellee’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s claim for violation of the FCA for 
failure to plead with particularity and failure to state a claim.”158 
This result is inexplicable. The court’s expectation that the defendant 
would simply give the relator the false claims is incomprehensible. The 
court states that there is a relaxed pleading standard when the information is 
exclusively in the hands of the defendant or the government, and then it 
dismisses the claim because the relator “could” go to the defendant and ask 
for the incriminating documents, which is likely an exercise in futility. 
Even though he was fired before he could return to his office even to collect 
his personal property,159 the court determined that “it defied credulity that 
he is unable to identify any details of a single false claim submitted to the 
government.”160 However, the court’s decision itself defies credulity and is 
a vivid example of the misapplication of Rule 9(b) and any so-called 
“relaxed” standard under the current regime of pleading.161 
                                                                                                                           
agent is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other 
manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because 
of lawful acts done by the employee, contractor, or agent on behalf of the 
employee, contractor, or agent or associated others in furtherance of other efforts 
to stop 1 or more violations of this subchapter. 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 156. Id. at 631-32. 
 157. Id. at 634. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 632 (“Appellant was unable to retrieve from his office his personal effects or 
documentation that supported his allegations.”). 
 160. Id. at 634. 
 161. The Fifth Circuit also falls into this trap. While admitting that a relator may plead 
with a relaxed specificity when the information is in the defendant’s control, it still keeps 
restrictions on the relators. United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 
336 F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir. 2003). While Willard’s one-sentence allegation would not have 
been sufficient under any standard, the court’s flippant dismissal due to the relator not 
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 3. The First Circuit Ignores Its Own Precedent of a “Relaxed” 
Standard 
In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
demonstrated the fact that even when applying a “relaxed” standard to the 
pleading of a specific claim in the complaint, demanding a specific invoice 
or bill undermines the qui tam provision in the FCA.162 Prior to the Rost 
case, the First Circuit had clearly stated in Karvelas:  
[W]e have said that Rule 9(b) pleading standards may be 
relaxed, in an appropriate case, when the opposing party is the 
only practical source for discovering the specific facts supporting 
a pleader’s conclusion. In such cases, even for a plaintiff’s 
allegations of fraud, if the facts would be peculiarly within the 
defendants’ control, a court may allow some discovery before 
requiring that plaintiff plead individual acts of fraud with 
particularity.163 
In Rost, the defendant was accused of submitting claims for 
reimbursement to the government for off-label uses of prescriptions.164 The 
relator, the former Vice President of Marketing in one of the defendant’s 
divisions, pled that he had “no control over or dealings with such entities” 
that were alleged to violate the FCA, and he therefore had “no access to the 
records in [the defendant’s] possession.”165 In his complaint, Rost named 
the distributors that promoted off-label uses, stated that the defendant 
provided $200 per patient to physicians who prescribed the drug, and 
alleged that the defendant hired promoters for the sole purpose of 
determining how to promote the drug for off-label uses.166  
Despite relying on Karvelas to dismiss the relator’s complaint, the 
appellate court determined that “[a]t most, Rost raises facts that suggest 
fraud was possible; but the complaint contained no factual or statistical 
evidence to strengthen the inference of fraud beyond possibility” because 
Rost never pled a specific claim.167 The court ignored its own clear 
                                                                                                                           
stating she did not have access to the documents demonstrates the danger of allowing the 
court to arbitrarily allow or disallow a more relaxed pleading standard. 
 162. United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 163. United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 229 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 164. Rost, 507 F.3d at 723. 
 165. Id. at 726. 
 166. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 17-18, United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 507 F.3d 720 (1st Cir. 2007) (No. 06-2627).  
 167. Rost, 507 F.3d at 733. 
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precedent, choosing to overlook the explicit claim that the defendant had 
sole possession of the claims,168 causing the relator to have absolutely no 
access to the information demanded by the court. Therefore, the relator was 
unable to reach the details of specific claims for payment. 
Although not requiring a relator to plead a specific claim when the 
evidence is in the defendant’s control occasionally allows a relator to 
appropriately plead a fraudulent scheme, the test is unreliable and still 
retains an improper focus of the application of Rule 9(b) to a qui tam 
complaint.  
V.  RULE 9(B) SHOULD NOT APPLY TO A QUI TAM COMPLAINT UNDER THE 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
Even though a majority of courts have determined that Rule 9(b) applies 
to a qui tam action, the Rule should not apply to an action filed under the 
False Claims Act.169 Facially, the FCA does not require fraud: “no specific 
intent to defraud is required.”170 Rather, an FCA action is a statutory 
violation not having any relation to a common law fraud charge, which is 
the violation contemplated by Rule 9.171  
The government or the relator in an FCA suit is not required to allege 
fraud for every violation of the FCA. In other words, a person may violate 
the FCA in other ways besides committing fraud. In the FCA, there are 
seven specific provisions that identify what constitutes a violation.172 Three 
of the primary provisions require either a “false or [a] fraudulent claim.”173 
The key is the disjunctive “or”—a claim need not be fraudulent to violate 
the statute. In the same vein, another provision requires the relator to allege 
“a false record or statement”; fraud is not even a violation of this provision 
of the FCA.174 Merely filing a false claim violates the FCA—no fraud is 
required, thereby removing it from the scope of Rule 9(b).175 
                                                                                                                           
 168. Even though the government would also have a copy of the claims at issue, the 
courts uniformly describe the information to be in the defendant’s possession.  
 169. HELMER, supra note 9, at 357. 
 170. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 171. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shell Oil Co., 183 F.R.D. 204, 208 (E.D. Tex. 
1998). 
 172. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G); see supra note 58. 
 173. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 174. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
 175. Helmer, while arguing that Rule 9(b) does not apply at all, nonetheless discusses 
that even if Rule 9(b) does apply to a qui tam complaint, then it cannot require absolute 
particularity. While not providing an explicit standard, he encourages the courts to find 
another way to apply Rule 9(b) to a relator’s claim. HELMER, supra note 9, at 360. 
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Further, the FCA does not require “specific intent to defraud.”176 The 
statute does require that the actor “knowingly” commit the act, which may 
be defined as “deliberate ignorance.”177 Such deliberate ignorance is not an 
element of a claim for fraud. Therefore, since fraud is not required for a 
violation of the FCA, the courts should not read such a requirement into the 
pleading; Rule 9(b) should not be blindly applied to a qui tam complaint.  
The Supreme Court recently stated that courts “should generally not 
depart from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of 
perceived policy concerns.”178 In other words, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure should not be extended beyond their typical application and 
intended purpose. Rule 9(b) should not be expanded to apply to the FCA, a 
situation where fraud is not required for a violation.179 Such actions are not 
contemplated by the Rule itself. The courts have determined in qui tam case 
law that the policy concerns reflected in Rule 9(b) are manifest in qui tam 
actions, forcing qui tam complaints to satisfy Rule 9(b). Such action is an 
inappropriate extension of the courts’ power. 
Simply because fraud is one way an actor may violate the FCA, it does 
not follow that the courts should apply Rule 9(b) to every qui tam 
complaint. If fraud is not alleged, pleading with particularity should not be 
demanded at all, since that complaint does not fall under the scope of the 
Rule. The words of the Supreme Court and the statute’s absence of fraud as 
a requirement demonstrate that Rule 9(b) should not automatically apply to 
all qui tam complaints. Regretfully, the courts have refused to undergo 
appropriate analysis, and they routinely apply Rule 9(b) to any and all qui 
tam actions, whether there is an allegation of fraud or not. While it is ideal, 
and legally appropriate, for Rule 9(b) not to be applied to any aspect of a 
qui tam complaint, it is far from the current state of the law. Therefore, it is 
necessary for the courts to employ a standard that balances the particularity 
requirement of Rule 9(b) with the short and plain pleading requirement of 
Rule 8.   
                                                                                                                           
 176. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).  
 177. Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(ii). Deliberate ignorance is not fraud and is not construed as 
fraudulent intent, thus providing more evidence that not every action that may violate the 
FCA requires fraud.  
 178. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). 
 179. But see 27 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S EDITION, 667 (Francis M. Dougherty 
ed., 2008) (“The particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) extends to all averments of fraud or 
mistake, whatever the theory of legal duty—statutory, tort, contractual, or fiduciary.”). 
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VI.  WHAT CAN BE DONE: PLEADING A FRAUDULENT  
SCHEME WITH PARTICULARITY 
In order to preserve the integrity of the False Claims Act and permit 
relators to function as assistants to the government, it is essential for the 
courts to adopt a proper interpretation of particularity under Rule 9(b). The 
“unique aspects of the FCA suggest that rigorous application of Rule 9(b) 
would undermine the Act. The Act is designed to encourage private 
individuals to report and pursue allegations of fraud against the 
Government.”180 Although some circuits have applied a “relaxed” 
particularity,181 proper complaints still fail because the courts apply Rule 
9(b) particularity to the wrong element of an action under the FCA. This 
results in the courts undermining the FCA and, in essence, allowing Rule 
9(b) to gut the power of a qui tam relator.  
A violation of the FCA essentially requires three elements: (1) there was 
a claim for a federal fund; (2) the claim was false; and (3) the defendant 
knew of its falsity.182 Unfortunately, when the courts demand that a relator 
plead with particularity under Rule 9(b),183 the relator is required to plead 
all three elements with particularity. However, this application is 
erroneous.184 Even though the FCA does not require any evidence of 
fraudulent intent for a violation, if the courts persist in applying Rule 9(b) 
to any FCA case, the heightened pleading requirement should only be 
applied to the element that most closely reflects fraudulent intent. Thus, 
courts should require the identification of a “scheme” to receive federal 
funds when the actor is not entitled to them. Therefore, Rule 9(b) should be 
applied only to the knowledge element of the action.  
In an effort to align the purposes of the FCA, Rule 9(b), and Rule 8, 
courts should adopt the following standard:  
                                                                                                                           
 180. SYLVIA, supra note 23, at 537. 
 181. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 182. United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physician Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th 
Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Darrig v. Med. Consultants Network, Inc., No. 04-650-HA, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80789, at *5-6 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2006), rev’d and remanded, 303 F. 
App’x 429 (9th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. Stewart v. La. Clinic, No. 99-1767, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9401, at *28 (E.D. La. June 4, 2003).  
 183. It is questionable that Rule 9(b) should even be applied to a qui tam complaint. See 
supra Part V. 
 184. As discussed in this Comment, such an application places an unreasonable burden 
on the relator when more often than not he does not have access to the claims despite 
firsthand knowledge of the defendant’s scheme.  
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When a relator identifies with particularity a defendant’s 
fraudulent scheme, the complaint is pled with sufficient 
particularity under Rule 9(b).  
Under this standard, Rule 9(b) is applied to the third element of an FCA 
violation: the defendant’s knowledge of falsity.185 Such a standard not only 
allows the government to benefit from those citizens willing to assist the 
government in uncovering false claims, but it also protects the FCA 
defendants. Complaints satisfying this standard provide defendants with 
sufficient detail and information to curtail spurious charges and allow them 
to prepare an adequate response to the allegations, a key purpose in 
applying Rule 9 to a qui tam complaint.186 This standard will also prevent 
relators from overcompensating with unnecessary verbiage in the 
complaints, thus also furthering the current pleading strictures under Rule 8.   
Consider two illustrations demonstrating how this standard will further 
the purposes of the FCA and Rule 9(b).  
Joe works as a nurse at a major hospital. An executive calls a staff 
meeting where he states that each time a patient comes in and is treated for 
a cold, the nurse working with the doctor is to change the diagnosis and 
treatment on the chart to pneumonia, thus obtaining more money from 
Medicare or Medicaid.187 Joe continues in his normal job, routinely 
observing patient charts and altering the doctors’ diagnoses on the charts 
from “cold” to “pneumonia.” After a few months, Joe decides that the 
scheme is wrong and that he has to do something. He goes to the managing 
nurse and tells him that the hospital is cheating Medicare. His superior asks 
                                                                                                                           
 185. The First Circuit recently determined that “providing ‘factual or statistical evidence 
to strengthen the inference of fraud beyond possibility’” only when the “defendant induced 
third parties to file false claims with the government” would be sufficient. United States ex 
rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2009). While this may 
allow a relator to allege a fraudulent scheme if he had sufficient indicia of reliability in this 
one circumstance, the First Circuit did not overrule Karvelas or provide any relaxation for 
other qui tam claims. Nonetheless, Duxbury represents a beacon of hope that the courts may 
be moving toward adopting the standard proposed in this Comment. 
 186. See supra note 23.  
 187. This fraudulent scheme is known as “upcoding.” “‘Upcoding,’ a common form of 
Medicare fraud, is the practice of billing Medicare for medical services or equipment 
designated under a code that is more expensive than what a patient actually needed or was 
provided, and is the source of much litigation under the False Claims Act.”  United States ex 
rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., 501 F.3d 493, 498 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007). For more details on 
different types of fraudulent schemes, see JOEL D. HESCH, WHISTLEBLOWING: HOW TO 
COLLECT MILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR REPORTING FRAUD, A GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT REWARD 
PROGRAMS (2008). 
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Joe if he has ever seen any claims being sent to Medicare—how would he 
know what is being paid? He is told to continue in the routine or be fired.  
Joe then files a qui tam complaint, alleging that the hospital knew that 
each common cold treated at the hospital was billed to Medicare as 
pneumonia. Joe does not work in the hospital’s billing or accounting 
department, so he cannot plead any specific invoices or claim numbers. He 
can, however, provide eyewitness testimony from the meeting that there is a 
fraudulent scheme occurring, and he can state that when he drew his 
supervisor’s attention to the illegality of the scheme, the supervisor told him 
to ignore the implications. After the complaint is unsealed and served on 
the defendant hospital, Joe is greeted with a motion to dismiss under Rule 
9(b).  
Regretfully, under the current application of Rule 9(b), even though Joe 
can name doctors who reported pneumonia, the time period the upcoding 
occurred, the meetings in which he participated, and the fact that he had a 
one-on-one conversation with the head nurse, he cannot point to a specific 
claim or invoice sent to the government. His complaint is dismissed for lack 
of particularity, leaving the government without the help of a willing 
relator. 
Under this Comment’s proposed standard, Joe’s complaint would satisfy 
the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Joe would be able to describe the 
fraudulent scheme in firsthand detail, with names of individuals in the 
meeting and the time he saw the upcoding. He would also be able to 
identify the hospital’s actual knowledge of falsity, since he can cite the 
conversation with the head nurse.188 Furthermore, he sat in the meetings 
where the entire scheme was outlined, witnessed the patients entering with 
a common cold, and saw the charts being altered to reflect treatment for 
pneumonia. Joe can plead the fraudulent scheme with particularity, 
satisfying the strictures of Rule 9(b).  
Consider another situation. A project manager who has been hired by the 
military to build aircraft tells Mike to use Grade B metal to build the 
aircraft. This is different than the metal the company used for the last few 
hundred planes; in fact, it is much cheaper. Mike follows his instructions, 
but discovers that under that contract, they were supposed to use only 
Grade A metal for the projects. Mike approaches the president of the 
company, telling him his concern about using Grade B instead of Grade A 
metal. The president asks if Mike has seen any such claims being submitted 
to the government. Since Mike is only a technician building the craft, he 
                                                                                                                           
 188. It is essential to remember that at this stage of the litigation, Joe is not proving 
liability; he is merely putting the defendant on notice in order to prepare a response.   
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cannot point to any exact claims; Mike is certain, however, that Grade B 
metal should not be used. Mike is ignored and told to do his job.  
Mike, after talking to the other workers, finds that this is not the first 
time that Grade B metal has been used under identical contracts with the 
government. He files a qui tam action under the FCA, alleging that the 
company he works for has been using Grade B metal while receiving 
payment for aircraft built with Grade A metal.  
Once again, if the defendant moved for dismissal under the current 
application of Rule 9(b), Mike would be left in the cold and could not assist 
the government in recovering the money that was obtained through the false 
claims. Under the standard proposed in this Comment, however, his 
complaint would satisfy the particularity demanded by Rule 9(b) because he 
could accurately describe the situation where the project manager instructed 
the use of the improper metal, the president was aware of the situation, and 
improper metal was consistently used in producing the aircraft. Even 
though he does not have access to an exact invoice, he can plead the general 
scheme with sufficient particularity; the company is using cheaper metal 
and billing the government for the expensive Grade A metal. 
VII.  THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ATTEMPTING A LEGISLATIVE 
REMEDY FOR THE CIRCUIT CONFUSION AND MISAPPLICATION  
For over twenty years, the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act 
have reigned as the government’s primary anti-fraud tool. Recently, 
Congress has once again decided that it is necessary to reevaluate the FCA. 
Due to the misapplication of Rule 9(b), the House of Representatives has 
included a legislative amendment that will address the misapplication 
among the circuits. The House has proposed:   
In pleading an action brought under section 3730(b), a person 
shall not be required to identify specific claims that result from 
an alleged course of misconduct if the facts alleged in the 
complaint, if ultimately proven true, would provide a reasonable 
indication that one or more violations of section 3729 are likely 
to have occurred, and if the allegations in the pleading provide 
adequate notice of the specific nature of the alleged misconduct 
to permit the Government effectively to investigate and 
defendants fairly to defend the allegations made.189 
                                                                                                                           
 189. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 4854, 110th Cong § 4(e) 
(2007). 
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This proposed legislative fix reflects the balance offered in this Comment to 
remedy the circuit confusion and the application of Rule 9(b) to the FCA. 
The proposed amendment may require even less particularity in a qui tam 
complaint than this Comment’s proposal that a relator be allowed to plead 
the defendant’s knowledge of a fraudulent scheme.190  
A. The Legislature May Override a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
The House of Representatives’ proposal raises the question of whether 
the legislature has the authority to overrule a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure. Under the Rules Enabling Act,191 “The Supreme Court shall 
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and 
rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including 
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”192 
Therefore, the legislature has authorized the Court to promulgate its own 
rules of procedure, including Rule 9(b).  
However, Congress does possess the authority to statutorily override a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.193 When evaluating the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and its relationship to Rule 8, the Tenth Circuit made the 
determination that “there is no contest as to the plenary power of Congress 
to statutorily supersede any or all of the Rules. But unless the congressional 
intent to do so clearly appears, subsequently enacted statutes ought to be 
construed to harmonize with the Rules, if feasible.”194 In other words, when 
Congress makes it clear that the purpose of the statute is to override the 
application of a Rule, then the statute is the standing procedural law. If the 
intent is clear, it must be read to comply with the Court’s rules of 
procedure.  
The Northern District of Texas agreed, ruling that a statute, when 
Congressional intent is clear, preempted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
17(b).195 The court held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
                                                                                                                           
 190. See infra Part VI.  
 191. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006). 
 192. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). 
 193. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Consol. Fibers, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 822 
(N.D. Tex. 1998). 
 194. United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 426 F.2d 539, 542 
(10th Cir. 1970). 
 195. BNSF, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 829. CERCLA governs a corporation’s capacity to be sued, 
which is normally governed by state law, and the capacity to be sued is delineated in FED. R. 
CIV. P. 17(b). The court determined that the intent behind CERCLA, a federal statute, was 
evident, in that it should preempt state statutes as well as the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  
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Compensation and Liability Act not only preempts state statutes, but also 
overrides the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when the congressional 
intent is clear or the statute creates “a regulatory scheme which wholly 
conflicts with the state statute.”196 
The First Circuit followed suit in its Grossman v. Johnson197 decision. In 
determining that a shareholder’s action had to properly satisfy the FRCP, 
the Court determined that there was insufficient evidence that Congress 
desired to override or add to a rule of civil procedure. The Court reiterated: 
“In the absence of a clear inconsistency or a demonstrated congressional 
purpose to exclude one or more of the Federal Rules, a subsequently 
enacted statute should be so construed as to harmonize with the Federal 
Rules if that is at all feasible.”198 
B. The False Claims Act Amendment Intends To Override Rule 9(b) 
Since the Amendments have not yet been enacted, the congressional 
record thus far is limited to a brief discussion contained within the House 
Record. In the congressional record, the purpose behind the amendment to 
the FCA is clear: to override the courts that have inappropriately dismissed 
relators’ claims when they properly allege a fraudulent scheme but fail to 
plead a specific false claim, providing greater flexibility in the pleading of 
an action under the FCA. In introducing the proposed amendments, 
Congressman Howard Berman199 of California stated:  
Many courts unreasonably have barred whistleblowers with 
potentially meritorious claims from pursuing cases. For example, 
the courts have dismissed cases brought by insiders who know 
key details of fraudulent schemes because they can’t plead 
specific details of the billing documentation, such as the dates 
and identification numbers of invoices—information ordinarily 
sought and obtained in discovery.200 
There is no question of the Congressional intent behind this proposed 
amendment to the FCA. It intends to override the courts’ current 
                                                                                                                           
 196. BNSF, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 826. 
 197. Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 198. Id. at 122-23 (emphasis added). The court evaluated the fact that in this instance, 
Congress had cited to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an appropriate safeguard in 
securities and distributions circumstances.  
 199. Congressman Berman, along with Senator Charles Grassley, sponsored the 1986 
Amendments to the FCA. 
 200. 153 CONG. REC. E2658, E2658 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Berman). 
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misapplication of Rule 9(b) to a qui tam complaint and provide greater 
flexibility in the pleading of an action under the FCA. 
After witnessing the functioning of the FCA for the last twenty-two 
years,201 Congress now considers amending the FCA in order to fulfill the 
underlying purposes of the FCA. “The law has not been a success in one 
critical respect: it could be doing far more.”202 This includes providing a 
proper pleading standard for a relator’s qui tam complaint: 
The amendments proposed in this legislation will remove 
these debilitating qualifications and to [sic] clarify that the Act is 
intended to “reach all types of fraud, without qualification” 
leading to Government losses. We intend for these amendments 
to apply to all future cases as well as all cases that are pending in 
the courts on the date the amendments become law. 
The Amendments’ most critical goals are the following: . . . 
[c]larifying that plaintiffs do not need to have access to 
individual claims data or documents to bring a False Claims Act 
case.203 
It cannot be clearer that Congress’s intent behind amending the FCA is to 
allow a relator to plead “an alleged course of misconduct” that would 
appropriately direct the defendant to prepare a sufficient defense based on 
the complaint itself.204 Congressman Berman makes explicit reference to 
the types of cases described in this Comment as an improper application of 
Rule 9(b), leaving an unmistakably clear path of intent to override Rule 
9(b).  
In addition to the statement of the Congressman himself, testimony at the 
Congressional hearings on the amendments reveals the purpose behind the 
                                                                                                                           
 201. In the words of Representative Berman: 
I am very happy to report that, in the years since 1986, the amended Act has 
returned over $20 billion to the United States Government that otherwise would 
have been lost to fraud. For the most part, the law has been a resounding 
success. The Government has received full compensation for many of its 
losses, and has also imposed financial penalties on many who have knowingly 
over-billed the Government. 
Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at E2658-59. 
 204. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 4854, 110th Cong. § 4(e) 
(2008). 
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proposed amendment. The testimony of Shelley R. Slade,205 an attorney 
specializing in whistleblower litigation, explained why the amendment is 
necessary:  
The courts are misguided in applying this aspect of Rule 9(b) 
jurisprudence in the FCA context. In contrast to common law 
fraud cases, the qui tam plaintiff in a FCA lawsuit is not a party 
to the fraudulent transaction. It is the United States . . . that is the 
party to the transaction. It is consequently unreasonable to expect 
the qui tam plaintiff to have access to the transactional 
documents, which are almost always held exclusively by the 
wrongdoer on the one hand, and the government itself on the 
other.206  
Congressional intent is clear: the purpose of the pleading standard in the 
False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007 is to overrule Rule 9(b) and the 
courts’ various misconstructions of that Rule. With the intent clearly in the 
fore, the Rule will be officially preempted and relators will be granted the 
appropriate pleading standard under the amended False Claims Act.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The near universal application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to 
a relator’s qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act is undermining the 
very purpose behind the Act. When the courts demand that a relator plead a 
specific claim, the relator is unable to ever satisfy the stringent particularity 
pleading standard. Since the courts have held that Rule 9(b) should be 
applied to a qui tam complaint, the courts must impose a standard that 
allows a relator to plead a specific fraudulent scheme, applying the 
particularity of Rule 9(b) to the knowledge of falsity aspect of the FCA.  
While the House of Representatives has proposed an appropriate answer 
to the misapplication of Rule 9(b) by crafting the False Claims Act 
Amendments to override the Rule, it is uncertain whether the legislative 
solution will be enacted. Whether Congress approves the amendments or 
                                                                                                                           
 205. Slade is a partner in the Washington, D.C. firm of Vogel, Slade, & Goldstein, LLP, 
which specializes in whistleblower litigation. She was also named one of the top 
whistleblowing attorneys in The Washingtonian. See http://www.washingtonian.com/ 
articles/mediapolitics/5907.html#whistleblower. For more information about Ms. Slade, see 
http://www.false-claims-act-health-care-fraud-whistleblower-attorney.com/index.php.  
 206. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 4854 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 24 (2008) (statement of Shelley R. Slade, Partner, 
Vogel, Slade & Goldstein, LLP). 
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not, however, the only way to permit full functionality of the FCA is to alter 
the overwhelming application of Rule 9(b) to the claim element of the qui 
tam action. By allowing a relator to plead a fraudulent scheme with 
particularity, the purposes of the FCA, as well as the purposes of requiring 
fraud to be pled with particularity, will be appropriately balanced, saving 
the government millions of dollars each year. 
